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Crisis States Programme 
 
Concepts and Research Agenda 
 
 
An institutional approach to Studying Crisis and Breakdown 
 
This project will seek to investigate the causes of 
crisis and breakdown in the “fragile states” of the 
developing world and the processes of avoiding or 
overcoming them. We will investigate why, when 
challenged by crises, some political, economic and 
social systems have been able to survive and reform 
while others have experienced a radical escalation 
of conflict and violence and whether processes of 
globalisation have precipitated or helped to avoid 
crisis and social breakdown. 
 
What do we mean by crisis and breakdown? 
In this project we define crisis and breakdown along 
a wide economic, political and social spectrum.  
 
We use the term ‘crisis’ to signify a situation where 
the political or economic system is confronted with 
challenges with which existing institutions and 
organisations are potentially unable to cope. We 
include here situations of sharp and deep disruption 
in economic life, a sharp rise in crime and violence 
in society, or deep turbulence in political life where 
organisations of governance lose their authority and 
legitimacy. The economic, political and social 
dimensions of crisis are inevitably linked together. 
Crisis in this sense is a condition of disruption 
severe enough to threaten the continued existence of 
established systems. We are concerned in part with 
understanding the causes of crises and in part with 
explaining what determines their outcomes.  
 
We are particularly interested in understanding the conditions that lead some systems to engage in 
processes of reform, restructuring, reshaping or ‘mutation’, whereby aspects of the system are 
modified to enable it to adapt to the new conditions and deal with the challenge, while others 
experience breakdown, where the system is incapable of adapting and dealing with such challenges 
and begins to disintegrate, such that the conflicts which it previously succeeded in containing and 
regulating cease to be contained and assume an unregulated and correspondingly disorderly form 
permeated by an aggravation of uncertainty and insecurity .1 We are also interested in 
                                                 
1 In some cases crises may precipitate revolution , whereby the system is replaced by a different one better equipped to 
deal with the challenge, or regression/reaction/restoration, where the system is replaced by the system which preceded 
it. In practice, of course, it may be difficult to observe this distinction between reform, breakdown, revolution or 
regression in a given case, since actual cases are liable to combine aspects of more than one possibility suggested by 
this typology. An inability to reform (or the failure of an attempt to reform) may lead to breakdown, but this may in turn 
be the prelude to an effective revolution (France 1789-92, Russia February-October 1917); here ‘breakdown’ may be 
conceptualised as a phase in the process whereby movement occurs from crisis to resolution of crisis. Regression to the 
Box 1. Why are some “fragile states” more 
vulnerable than others? 
 
Late developing countries, where processes 
of economic development have lagged behind 
the richest countries are generally “fragile  
states”, in the sense that institutional 
arrangements are vulnerable to crisis and 
breakdown. Yet some countries and some 
“sub-national” regions have proven to be 
more vulnerable than others and we aim to 
understand why.  
 
For example, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh 
have significant features in common (historic 
levels of poverty, little sense of sub-national 
identity, upper caste domination), but the 
former has achieved only very low rates of 
growth and experienced fragmentation into 
decentralised fiefdoms often controlled by 
local warlords, while the latter has enjoyed 
robust growth and effective and progressive 
government.  
 
Burkina Faso and Niger shared many 
characteristics, yet institutional arrangements 
in Burkina at both national and local levels 
on the whole have proven more resilient in 
the face of internal and external pressures 
than those in Niger, where institutional 
breakdown and violence has been much more 
extensive.  
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understanding the social and political processes and shape of institutions in situations where crises 
may endure over relatively long periods of time without clear moments of resolution. 
 
What is our concern with violence, crime and war? 
We are concerned with violence and crime to the extent that they are indicative of the development 
of conflicts beyond the point where they are contained and regulated by previously established 
institutional systems. In short, it is our primary concern with ‘crisis’ and ‘breakdown’ (and our 
associated concern with institutional reform) that furnishes us with the criteria by which we will 
determine the relevance of both particular instances of conflict and particular instances of violence 
to our proposed research. The uncertainty that characterises situations of breakdown is particularly 
salient in relation to violence, a characteristic of human behaviour that is intrinsically 
unpredictable,2 and in some of the proposed research we will seek to understand the dynamics of 
situations where violence has become, in a sense, “a way of life”.  
 
We will differentiate between different instances of breakdown (including those which manifest 
themselves in similar degrees of violence) in terms of our analysis of their dynamics and thus too 
our evaluation of their significance. For instance, the onset of civil war may be considered to be an 
instance of breakdown, in that the previous political system has clearly failed to contain and 
regulate the conflict in question. Yet a civil war may itself turn out to be a crucial moment in the 
forging of a new order.3  
 
We are interested in understanding the patterns of violence that appear to have flourished despite 
(or even because of) the subsidence of ideologically based armed movements, the removal of 
authoritarian regimes and the introduction of formal democratic organisations. Crime and 
delinquency are not new phenomena in the developing countries and political violence and 
repression are by no means extinct. The boundaries between these two “types of violence” have 
never been entirely clear. However, while it is important not to underestimate the continuities 
between past and present forms of violence, it can be argued that in contrast to the generally 
organised nature of the political and ideological violence of the past, the defining features of the 
new forms of violence, which have become so prevalent in many parts of the world, is that they are 
more “diffuse” and “disordered”. There has occurred a process of what could be seen as the 
“democratization of violence”, whereby “it [has] ceased to be the resource of only the traditionally 
powerful or of the grim uniformed guardians of the nation ...[but] increasingly appears as an option 
for a multitude of actors in pursuit of all kinds of goals”. 4 This has important consequences for any 
effort to circumscribe violence, and to organise social life around the minimisation of risk. 
 
Challenging Assumptions about Institutional Reform 
Most approaches to the study of crisis assume that 
these events are aberrations, or departures from a 
norm of stability, social peace and security – in 
                                                                                                                                                                  
status quo ante may be the same thing as breakdown if there was no effective order before the establishment of the 
political status quo. An apparently successful revolution may turn out for any one of a variety of reasons to be the 
prelude to breakdown (Afghanistan; USSR ?). 
2 Rodgers, 1999, p.92 citing Arendt, 1969, p.5. 
3 Civil war may lead directly to the establishment of what we would be disposed to regard as a more progressive as well 
as more effective form of government (e.g. USA 1865, Uganda 1986); it may do so indirectly (contemporary Spanish 
democracy in part the beneficiary of the economic modernisation promoted by Franco?); or it may simply but 
profoundly establish a new line of political cleavage in a society which furnishes the basis of the subsequent 
development of party-political pluralism and thus a stable democracy (e.g. England 1640-1649, Eire 1921-1923). On the 
other hand, a civil war may result in an intensification of chronic breakdown. This raises the question of what we mean 
by civil war, and whether it is possible to employ the term in  respect of many contemporary situations of violent 
breakdown (Lebanon, Algeria, Somalia, Bosnia for example.) without debasing the concept. 
4 Kruijt & Koonings, 1999, p.11. 
Box 2. Combining Institutional Analysis 
and the Political Economy of Conflict. 
 
We will combine the approach pioneered by 
Douglas North and the new institutional 
theorists (who focus on incentive and 
accountability systems) with the comparative 
historical approach of Barrington Moore and 
others (focusing on class and other forms of 
conflict) and the emerging political economy 
of con lict approach (focussing on who gains 
from conflict). This should allow us to develop 
an un erstanding of the rationality of 
individuals and groups in conflict. It should 
provide a better guide to policy than 
observations generated by cross-country 
surveys and economic testing that take little 
account of context. 
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short, departures from a normal state of equilibrium. Policy interventions are often designed to 
“restore” stability and peace and are based on assumptions that the reasons for economic, social and 
political breakdown are local and due to the absence of an ideal set of political and economic 
institutions and organisations.  
 
Programmes of “institutional reform” –  a change in the rules by which economic and political 
systems and their organisations function - are ostensibly promoted by international agencies to get 
countries on to a “normal track” of growth, improved economic and social welfare, freedom and 
security. Interventions in extreme situations of violent conflict and war are based on notions of 
“conflict resolution”. Political reforms, notably those based on introducing systems of electoral 
politics, based on constitutional models of the developed democracies, and anti-corruption 
campaigns are universally seen as means of achieving stability, peace and progress. 
 
Our programme of research seeks to question these assumptions in several different ways. First, we 
recognise that conflict, broadly defined, is inherent in all social, economic and political relations. 
Second, we see institutions - or the rules that govern behaviour in economic, social and political 
systems and organisations (whether at the local, national or international levels) – in part as the 
means that emerge in these systems to “contain and regulate conflict”. 5 Third, we suggest that any 
change in reigning institutional arrangements therefore can have both costs and benefits – there is 
no costless reform – and will affect conflicting interests and the balance of power between them in 
ways that are often unintended by those who promote institutional reform. Fourth, the causes of 
crisis can be both endogenous and exogenous and understanding their origins, dynamics and the 
means to get beyond them requires an historical approach and study at local, national and 
international levels. 
 
Existing research on institutional reform and on violent conflict has tended to take the individual as 
the basic unit of analysis. This cannot explain how and why a polity collapses into the kind of large-
scale and persistent violence we have seen in Colombia, Algeria and parts of Ind ia, how some 
polities have resisted collapse, or how order can be reestablished once it breaks down. We will 
examine the new political, economic and moral systems emerging from apparent collapse. We need 
to look at the dynamics of ‘communities/collectivities’ to understand issues of 
‘morality/immorality’ of violence (Allen and Heald) and the livelihood strategies that people adopt 
to cope with crisis (Beall and Francis). Our concern with historical analysis will transcend the 
limitations of much of the new institutional literature on problems of governance and economic 
reform and the micro-level work on livelihoods. 
 
 
Research Agenda and Questions  
Our programme of research will investigate the sources of crisis and breakdown in some of the 
“fragile” political economies that make up the developing world through research at the global, 
national and local levels. Understanding both the causes of crisis and the processes of institutional 
change and reform in response to crises can only be deepened by examining the linkages between 
processes situated both within particular countries and those in wider regional and global systems, 
and the interrelationship between local, national and international systems. In what follows we 
outline the principal issues and questions that will be examined in the projects that make up this 
programme of work. Most of the research projects operate across the boundaries of local, national 
and global levels and we have tried to reflect that in the way we have organised the programme. 
 
                                                 
5 Of course institutions do not act only in relation to conflict in society. In fact, we reject the notion in Northian new 
institutional economics that institutions should be defined exclusively as “constraints that structure human interaction” 
(North, 1995, p.23), which is based on a Hobbesian characterisation of human behaviour, and instead would see 
institutions as both constraining and enabling human action (Putzel, 1997). 
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From the global to the national 
There is virtually no community in the world that is not deeply affected by changes wrought beyond 
its boundaries, so the patterns of cooperation and conflict that can be observed at local, national and 
international levels are intimately related. Changes in the global economy, in patterns of geopolitics 
at the global level and in the richest nation states (members of the OECD), which set policy and 
international legal standards, and international organisations like the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation and the agencies of the United Nations, have profound effects on local and national 
political, economic and social systems in the developing world.  
 
This programme of work will look at the impact of global economic changes on patterns of conflict 
in a number of developing countries. We are interested in the impact of both the structural changes 
in the global economy and the policy prescriptions related to economic development that have 
gained authority at the international level. We are also interested in the impact of changes in the 
patterns of politics at the international level, of reigning ideas and policy prescriptions about 
political, legal and administrative reform, and of changes in international law on patterns of conflict 
in the developing countries. 
 
Our work that stretches from the global to the national level is thus three-fold. First, we want to 
examine the extent to which changes at this level have offered new opportunities for growth, 
poverty reduction and the social and economic conditions to overcome crises or, conversely, the 
extent to which these have in fact precipitated crisis and breakdown in parts of the developing 
world. Of course, we expect to see both constructive and destructive trends and it will be our 
objective to analyse the conditions under which either trend is more likely to prevail. 
 
This leads to two interrelated and rather sweeping questions that will be addressed by several of our 
research projects:  
 
1) How have changes in the patterns of international trade and finance affected the structure of 
economic organisation and thus the patterns of wealth accumulation, income earning and social 
inclusion and exclusion?  
 
2) What effect have these changes in the global economy and the structure of national economic 
organisation had on the institutional arrangements that govern the distribution of political power, 
coalition formation, community organisation and social cohesion (see box 3)? Specifically, what 
effect have they had on national governments’ ability to contain and regulate social conflict. 
 
Second, we hope to gain a better 
understanding of the extent to which 
interventions of various kinds by the 
international community and the policy 
prescriptions they have promoted contribute 
either to exacerbating breakdown or to 
creating the conditions to overcome crises 
and breakdown. This takes us onto the terrain 
of examining both the impact of reform 
policies advocating structural adjustment, 
economic liberalisation, democratisation and 
respect for human rights on patterns of 
conflict in developing countries, as well as 
the impact of interventions in situations of 
breakdown and violent conflict. This is a vast 
Box 3. The Political Consequences of the New 
Economic Order. 
 
In the case of South Africa, labour emerged as a 
key actor in the transition to democracy in 1990-94. 
Part of the dividend for labour’s support for its 
political ally, the ANC, was a very labour friendly 
legislative regime. This gave labour an 
institutionalised voice at enterprise, sectoral and 
national level. Under global pressure for greater 
labour flexibility, this framework is now under 
challenge. Large numbers of workers do not have 
much of a voice at work and trade union influence 
appears to be declining with little capacity to 
represent the growing number of casual workers 
and those earning a livelihood in the informal 
economy. 
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terrain, but a number of our projects will address the following related questions: 
 
3) How have prescriptions of liberalisation, privatisation and fiscal reform promoted by 
international actors affected national governments’ ability to contain and regulate social 
conflict? 
 
4) What effect have internationally 
promoted prescriptions for political and 
administrative reform had on institutional 
reforms at the national and local levels 
and what impact have they had on 
patterns of conflict, as well as on the 
composition, support and strategies of 
opposition movements? 
 
5) What has been the impact of international 
sanctions on the ‘rogue’ regimes and 
groups they have been designed to target? 
Who has benefited and who lost from the 
imposition of sanctions and under what circumstances have they achieved their objectives or 
alternatively served to consolidate the position and power of those who they were designed to 
undermine (see box 4)? 
 
6) What are the main precepts of international law that may be relevant to the prevention of, or 
response to, situations of breakdown? How effective is this body of law? Specifically, as an 
example of the role of law in situations of breakdown, how relevant is the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child - as one of the more - comprehensive recent treaties (incorporating both 
human rights and humanitarian law) - to situations of breakdown as part of a strategy of 
prevention or response? 
 
Third, rather than simply taking these structural and policy changes at the global level as given, our 
understanding of their impact must be informed by an analysis of the processes and constellations 
of power that have brought them about. In other words, we want to turn the lens around and ask 
where does the agenda for liberalisation that has been so influential in determining the parameters 
of national and local development come from in the first place. While the new policy agenda works 
on the assumption that trade and financial opening improves policy discipline and economic 
efficiency, this claim has been contested by many serious theorists on theoretical and empirical 
grounds.6 These theorists claim that premature opening has caused, and intensified, financial crisis 
in many developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s, and these crises have often amplified the 
wider sorts of breakdown that are the focus of the Centre’s work.  
 
7) Why, given the problematic nature of these prescriptions have an increasing number of 
countries chosen this path, especially in the 1990s? 
 
8) What has been the role of the IMF and the World Bank in setting this agenda, and what are the 
political forces that have driven their decision-making processes? What, in particular has been 
the role of the US Treasury in this regard?  
                                                 
6 Stiglitz, Wade. 
Box 4. Profiting from Sanctions.  
 
“In the former Yugoslavia,  Slobodan Milosevic 
and his cabal defended themselves against 
democracy with a series of conflicts that reinforced 
a Serb ‘siege mentality’, deepened politically – and 
economically – advantageous sanctions, 
legitimised undemocratic rule, stigmatised political 
opposition as ‘Western collaborators’, and allowed 
various kinds of asset-transfer from ordinary 
people to this cabal (not least from ordinary Serbs 
through a variety of pyramid schemes, taxation and 
monopolistic pricing).” – David Keen 
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We expect that our studies of the causes of 
crisis and breakdown at the national and local 
levels will raise other questions about these 
processes at the global level and therefore this 
part of our agenda will be tackled after 
considerable work at the local and national 
levels has been undertaken. It may well form 
the basis for the second phase of the Centre’s 
work (setting the agenda for a further 5 years 
of research). 
 
From the national to the local 
While we are concerned with the impact of 
global processes on patterns of crisis at the 
national and local levels, the endogenous 
sources of crisis and breakdown remain in 
many ways fundamental and are of central 
importance to our programme of research. The 
countries where we plan to work are all late 
developers and understanding patterns of 
conflict, crisis, breakdown and institutional 
reform must take careful account of their: 
“stage of development” from an historical perspective; political organization; political strategies; 
economic strategies; and economic performance. 
 
We need to understand what makes some countries or regions within countries more vulnerable to 
breakdown and violent conflict and crime, and less able to initiate reform and processes of peaceful 
conflict resolution, than others. To investigate this our programme will undertake research around 
four central issues that stretch from the national to the local level. 
  
First, we want to look at how forms of political organisations and institutions have been related to 
the capacity to regulate and contain conflict, and deal with crises and whether some are more prone  
to breakdown than others. Related to this, we are concerned with exploring the extent to which 
violent conflict can be seen as rational – and interrogate the relationship between predictable and 
unpredictable violence and between “greed and grievance”. This means exploring not only the way 
elites manipulate situations of violent conflict 
and disorder, but also the “shared goals” of those 
involved directly in violent conflict (see box 5).  
This should contribute to understanding the 
causes of breakdown and also to understanding 
the possibilities for the resolution of violent 
conflicts. 
 
1) What has been the relationship of different 
frameworks of political representation to the 
capacity or incapacity of political systems to 
contain and regulate conflict generated by 
economic and social change? Specifically, 
we are interested in examining the record of 
various types of “participationist” forms of 
political organisation (based on allegiance to 
Box 5. War as a Political and Economic 
Instrument.  
 
“Rather than simply being concerned with 
‘winning’, many of those helping to shape 
violence during a conflic t have other aims, aims 
which often foster a very enduring violence… In 
Sierra Leone, for example, government soldiers 
and rebels - who made a joint coup in May 1997 
- shared important interests not just in 
preserving systems of economic exploitation 
that had flourished under the cover of war but 
also in preventing recriminations or 
prosecutions under a democratic government. 
Meanwhile, elements of the old one-party 
regime that dominated politics in the 1970s and 
1980s have manipulated conflict, first, to 
prolong their hold on power (through failing to 
confront the rebel Revolutionary United Front), 
and then later to undermine successor regimes 
(through covert support for the rebels).” 
– David Keen 
Box 6. The New Face of Violence in 
Nicaragua. 
 
“During the war of the 1980s, the streets of 
Nicaragua’s cities were at peace. Now that 
peace has been declared, however, the city 
streets are the scenes of a warfare more violent 
than any of the past, as pandillas, or youth 
gangs, roam the streets of urban 
neighbourhoods, robbing, beating, terrorising, 
and killing. Neighbourhood turf or territorial 
conflicts transform the country’s urban centres 
into quasi-war zones, as gangs escalate the 
weaponry of their semi-ritualized fighting from 
initial sticks, stones, and knives to AK-47s, 
fragmentation grenades, and mortars, with often 
obviously dramatic consequences. Urban 
neighbourhoods are pervaded by widespread 
fear and insecurity, as inhabitants virtually live 
in a state of siege.” – Dennis Rodgers 
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populist leaders, organised around communal or ethnic identities, etc) versus the record of 
programmatic political parties. 
 
2) Have competitive political systems, usually considered as “formally democratic” exacerbated or 
reduced the possibilities of breakdown and under what conditions? 
 
3) What are the factors that have led to political fragmentation and the “criminalisation of politics” 
that are usually associated with breakdown and the increase of violent conflict? How important 
has the decline of ideologically inspired oppositional organisations been to the proliferation of 
the “criminalisation of politics” and the proliferation of “disordered violence” (see box 6)? 
 
4) How do some courses of action come to seem - and how are they made by powerful people to 
seem - 'rational'?  What are the ‘shared goals’ of those involved in violent confrontations and 
does identifying them contribute to the possibilities of securing peace? 
 
Second, we are concerned with how changes in patterns of economic organisation have affected 
political and social organisation in ways more or less conducive to breakdown. In most developing 
countries there has been a move away from statist forms of economic management that shaped 
patterns of class and group power and bred forms of social organisation, mechanisms of bargaining 
between conflicting interests and patterns of conflict mediation. Increased informalisation of 
employment may have profound effects on the livelihood prospects of those without significant 
assets and their ability to organise as a class. 
 
5) How have changes in economic organisation changed patterns of class power and class 
coalitions, as well as the basis of group organisation and the manner in which social groups 
participate in politics? Specifically, have they given rise to new class alliances or the 
organisation of politics on the basis of other identities (caste, ethnicity, etc) at the expense of , or 
in opposition to, former ruling coalitions and how has this affected political order? 
 
6) How have forms of industrial restructuring, and the expansion of the informal sector as the site 
of income earning, affected associational patterns among poor groups and their ability to bargain 
over their interests and exercise voice within the political arena, and thus the possibilities for 
ordered and non-violent conflict resolution?  
 
7) Is there a connection between the rise of populism and appeals to identity as a basis of 
organisation, with the informalisation of employment?  
 
8) Has economic change led to an expansion of income earning opportunities or increased 
unemployment and the proliferation 
of destructive activities like the sex 
trade and crime, that could exacerbate 
other social problems like the AIDS 
crisis or create unsustainable demands 
for increased public spending on law 
and order and social welfare (see box 
7)? 
 
Third, we are concerned with the impact 
of policies of liberalisation, privatisation 
and fiscal austerity (whether or not they 
have been promoted by international 
actors) on the capacity of state 
Box 7. Heads or Tails? Economic Change and 
Social Turmoil in the New South Africa. 
 
“Since 1994, with the collapse of apartheid, South 
Africa has boasted an impeccably democratic 
constitution, which confers a series of liberties, 
rights and opportunities on all its citizens…Yet at 
the same time, the threats to social, economic and 
political stability in post-apartheid South Africa 
remain serious. To name a few: crime rates have 
rocketed; income differentials have grown even 
starker as problems of unemployment have 
deepened; violence of various forms - particularly 
sexual violence - remains disturbingly prevalent, 
and the scourge of AIDs threatens to destroy a 
generation of economically active citizens and 
overwhelm an already ailing public health service.” 
– Marks Chabedi & Debbie Posel 
 8
organisations and institutions to regulate and contain conflict and mediate between parties to 
conflict. 
 
9) How have these policies affected the link between state organisations and powerful groups 
within society and the bargaining processes that existed previously? 
 
10) How have these changes in the role of the state affected patterns of patronage and the capacity 
to deliver social services that may have been the source of economic inefficiencies in the past 
but also acted to contain and regulate conflict? 
 
Fourth, we are concerned with the impact of political reforms proposed within the ‘governance 
agenda’ of international organisations (including those related to democratisation, decentralisation, 
human rights, public-private partnership and the development of civil society) on patterns of 
conflict, violence and crime and the possibilities for containing them, increasing cooperation and 
participation, and overcoming breakdown.  
 
11) Linked to the first question in this 
section, to what extent has the 
introduction of competitive politics 
under pressure from external 
intervention expanded or reduced 
processes of breakdown and violent 
conflict (see box 8)? 
 
12) How has the international legal 
pressure on countries to comply with 
‘human rights norms’ affected political 
and social organisation and has it had 
any significant impact in national law 
and policy?  
 
13) To what extent have decentralisation 
measures precipitated breakdown, 
offered the means to respond 
constructively to crisis, or made no 
meaningful impact and what are the 
conditions that lead to these alternative 
outcomes? 
 
 
From the local to the national and the global  
The assumption underpinning research that will begin at the local level is that the impact of war, 
conflict and rapid and disruptive social and economic change, while devastating on individual and 
collective lives, can be experienced as the everyday, constituting the backdrop against which people 
act out large periods of their lives. Aggregated and broad-brush analyses of political, economic and 
social upheaval tell us little about the complexity of people’s problems, choices and possibilities 
under such circumstances. In other words, the events, activities, institutional interactions and social 
relationships associated with ‘crisis and breakdown’ are often of an on-going, long-term nature, 
which pre-date and out- live significant disordering political events and periods at the national level 
and beyond.  
 
Box 8. Democratisation and Violence in 
North Africa.  
 
“The introduction of formal party-political 
pluralism in Algeria in 1989 was perceived as 
going much further than any comparable 
development in the Arab world …[including] 
Egypt …Since January-February 1992, when 
Algerian army commanders forced the 
cancellation of the second round of national 
legislative elections which the Islamic Salvation 
Front (FIS) was poised to win, and then banned 
the FIS altogether, Algeria has been plunged 
into a situation of violence of dramatic 
proportions, with over 100,000 dead and no end 
in sight today. The Egyptian experience, on the 
other hand, offers a remarkable contrast. While 
Egypt also has faced a challenge from the 
Islamist movement, this has mainly been that of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, which has long 
eschewed violent methods; and while the radical 
Islamist fringe has engaged in violence, this has 
fallen a very long way short of the Algerian 
case.” – adapted from Hugh Roberts 
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Much of what people think and do during periods of acute disruption or disorder is influenced by a 
multiplicity of factors and is experienced in very local ways. It is not possible to deduce what is 
happening at the local level just by observing the national and international levels, because they 
intersect with local processes and do not simply determine them. Work that begins at the local level 
will be carried out in a variety of settings including those emerging from periods of aggravated 
conflict, breakdown and war, as well as those where relatively stable and peaceful relations have 
prevailed despite conditions of crisis.  
 
First, we want to understand why under similar economic and social conditions, in some regions 
violence has put down roots amongst the local people, while in others peace predominates.  We will 
examine the workings of local institutions and political party systems and the action of local 
political authorities. The goal will be to determine what are the systematic political, institutional and 
economic differences between violent and non-violent regions. This research will be placed in the 
context of the local economy and economic actors, natural resource endowments, and the local 
distribution of income and wealth. 
 
1) To what extent does local government represent local civic society and its demands and needs, 
and then respond effectively to the same?  
 
2) What are the linkages between the inclusiveness of local politics, the effectiveness of local 
government, and civil violence and social breakdown? 
 
3) How have measures of devolution or decentralisation affected the local matrix of conflict and 
cooperation? 
 
Second, we want to identify the strategies poor people follow in rural and in urban areas, in 
constructing or reconstructing their livelihoods in situations of discord and upheaval, often where 
natural resources are fragile and the object of conflict. We want to understand ways in which 
livelihoods are maintained, reconstructed and created in the wake of violent conflicts.  
 
4) What are the endowments and histories that people draw upon, which inform how they are able 
to respond to the challenges, both positive and negative, presented by fluid, unstable and 
uncertain social and economic environments? 
 
5) What happens when formal market institutions  (related to local, national and cross border 
commodity and labour markets) are eroded or break down in the absence of effective state 
regulation and what practices, relationships and informal institutions do people engage in to 
achieve or maintain a secure economic position? 
 
6) How do people cope with the direct legacy of war and its impact on livelihood possibilities 
through the persistence of violence and banditry often perpetrated by former combatants (with 
ample access to weapons and the knowledge to use them) even beyond the geographical limits 
of war zones?  
 
7) How do household and family forms (relationships within households, both across gender and 
generation) affect people’s strategies to secure livelihoods, recognising that ‘families’ 
themselves are often fragmenting and reforming under the strains of people’s efforts to maintain 
social reproduction? Do people retreat into families or do wider forms of trust and networks and 
communities of reciprocity, mutuality and altruism persist? 
 
Third, we want to understand what happens to associational life, local politics and public action in 
situations of violent conflict and post-conflict reconstruction (see box 9).  The starting point for this 
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part of the investigation is that while generalised national level or international transition is essential 
for transformatory politics and policy, local arenas are crucial sites of struggle towards social 
change.  It is at the local level that state support on the one hand, or oppression, neglect and 
breakdown on the other, is felt. It is here too that resistance is generated. The research will question 
dichotomised characterisations of people either as heroes of resistance or as passive and hopeless, 
absorbed by fatalism. We will analyse 
associational life at the local level and the widely 
divergent bases on which it may be organised 
and how these relate to political organisations 
and agencies of the central state. We want to 
understand the micro-politics of everyday life 
and the ways in which struggles become 
collective, publicly articulated and politically 
engaged in at different times. 
 
8) How is social and political life 're-
normalised' in the wake of violent conflict 
and war? 
 
9) Do local people actually see the livelihood 
strategies they contrive as forms of resistance 
against the state? 
 
10) How far do local people and local initiatives 
build upon older principles of authority and 
hierarchy, or alternatively do they construct 
new institutional forms (such as new cults 
and churches or vigilante groups and people's 
militia). Do these provide a basis for a central 
state to extend its legitimacy and operational 
capability, or, do they, alternatively, 
challenge state structures at the local level, 
either in overt defiance or by providing 
informal and relatively hidden structures for 
living?  
 
11) Why do impoverished and defenseless people at some times risk arrest, torture and even death 
to fight regimes they seemed to have little chance of defeating and why do protests occur in 
some areas and not others? Under what conditions do people engage in collective and public 
action and what is the potential for the formation of social movements under conditions of 
conflict or post-conflict reconstruction? 
 
12) To what extent have processes of  breakdown provoked extreme marginalisation? Have 
measures of reconstruction actually involved marginalising and demobilising the majority? Has 
‘conflict management’ at the local level systematically benefited some at the expense of others? 
 
13) Does the return of democratically elected political parties to the forefront signal the demise of 
popular organisations and grass-roots activism and a return to ‘politics as usual’? 
 
We invite comments on the conceptual framework and research agenda laid out in this paper. We 
are interested in exploring the possibilities for collaborative work with individuals and organisations 
who share a concern with these issues and problems. 
Box 9. Business-led Peace Initiatives in 
Colombia. 
 
“Business involvement in the peace process 
in Colombia has been mixed, ranging from 
support to open opposition. While most of 
the business sector remains unengaged or 
favors a “strong hand” approach (which 
may include the funding of illegal 
paramilitary or self-defense groups, for 
example), growing evidence that a military 
solution is not viable and that the business 
community is one of the principal targets of 
the guerrillas—who “tax” businesses, 
kidnap business executives, and destroy the 
economic infrastructure—has increased  the 
business sector’s awareness of the cost of 
the ongoing war. As a result, there have 
been a growing number of business 
initiatives at the local level towards the 
building of peace. In Medellín, for example, 
local businesses supported the peace 
accords with the city’s urban militias; in 
exchange for giving up their weapons, 
militia members were promised jobs in 
local companies and positions of communal 
authority.” – adapted from Angelika 
Rettberg 
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